I just read the fifth installment in the
National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) series of reports aimed at providing a
framework for thinking about the future entitled "Global
Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds". It's an excellent report well worth
reading.
In this volume, they expanded their coverage
of disruptive technologies, devoting a separate section to it in the work. They engaged with research
scientists at DoE laboratories at Sandia, Oak Ridge, and NASA in addition to
entrepreneurs and consultants in Silicon Valley and Santa Fe to help put
together this section of the report.
This volume also contains a chapter on the
potential trajectories for the U.S. role in the international System as well as a chapter on delineating
possible future directions and their impact on the broader evolution of the
international system.
This report is
intended to stimulate thinking about the rapid and vast geopolitical changes
characterizing the world today and possible global trajectories during the next
15-20 years. The following are some selected excerpts
from this report:
[Excerpts from "Global Trends 2030: Alternative
Worlds"]
MegaTrends
The world of 2030
will be radically transformed from our world today. By 2030, no country—whether
the US, China, or any other large country—will be a hegemonic power. The
empowerment of individuals and diffusion of power among states and from states
to informal networks will have a dramatic impact, largely reversing the historic
rise of the West since 1750, restoring Asia’s weight in the global economy, and
ushering in a new era of “democratization” at the international and domestic
level. In addition to individual empowerment and the diffusion of state power,
we believe that two other megatrends will shape our
world out to 2030:
- demographic patterns, especially rapid aging; and
- growing
resource demands which, in the cases of food and water, might lead to scarcities.
These trends, which are virtually certain, exist today, but during the next
15-20 years they will gain much greater momentum.
Underpinning the
megatrends are tectonic shifts—critical changes to key features of our global
environment that will affect how the world “works”.
NIC – Tectonic Shifts Between Now and and 2030
- Growth of the Global Middle Class - Middle classes
most everywhere in the developing world are poised to expand substantially in
terms of both absolute numbers and the percentage of the population that can
claim middle-class status during the next 15-20 years.
- Wider Access to Lethal and Disruptive Technologies - A wider spectrum
of instruments of war—especially precision-strike capabilities, cyber instruments,
and bio-terror weaponry—will become accessible. Individuals and small groups
will have the capability to perpetrate large-scale violence and disruption—a
capability formerly the monopoly of states.
- Definitive Shift of Economic Power to the East and South - The U.S., European,
and Japanese share of global income is projected to fall from 56 percent today
to well under half by 2030. In 2008, China overtook the U.S. as the world’s
largest saver; by 2020, emerging markets’ share of financial assets is
projected to almost double.
- Unprecedented and Widespread Aging - Whereas in 2012
only Japan and Germany had matured beyond a median age of 45 years, most European
countries, South Korea, and Taiwan will have entered the post-mature age
category by 2030. Migration will become more globalized as both rich and
developing countries suffer from workforce shortages.
- Urbanization - Today’s roughly 50-percent urban population will climb to nearly 60
percent, or 4.9 billion people, in 2030. Africa will gradually replace Asia
as the region with the highest urbanization growth rate. Urban centers are
estimated to generate 80 percent of economic growth; the potential exists to apply
modern technologies and infrastructure, promoting better use of scarce
resources.
- Food and Water Pressures - Demand for food is expected to rise at least 35 percent by 2030 while
demand for water is expected to rise by 40 percent. Nearly half of the world’s population will
live in areas experiencing severe water stress. Fragile states in Africa and
the Middle East are most at risk of experiencing food and water shortages,
but China and India are also vulnerable.
- U.S. Energy Independence - With shale gas, the U.S. will have sufficient natural gas to meet
domestic needs and generate potential global exports for decades to come. Increased
oil production from difficult-to-access oil deposits would result in a
substantial reduction in the U.S. net trade balance and faster economic
expansion. Global spare capacity may exceed over 8 million barrels, at which
point OPEC would lose price control and crude oil prices would collapse,
causing a major negative impact on oil-export economies.
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Game-changer 1: The Crisis-Prone Global Economy
The international economy almost certainly
will continue to be characterized by various regional and national economies moving at significantly
different speeds—a pattern reinforced by the 2008 global financial crisis. The contrasting speeds
across different regional economies are exacerbating global imbalances and
straining governments and the international system. The key question is whether
the divergences and increased volatility will result in a global breakdown and
collapse or whether the development of multiple growth centers will lead to
resiliency. The absence of a clear hegemonic [leadership or predominant
influence exercised by one nation over others] economic power could add to the volatility.
Some experts have compared the relative decline in the economic weight of the U.S.
to the late 19th century when economic dominance by one player—Britain—receded
into multipolarity.
A return to pre-2008 growth rates and
previous patterns of rapid globalization looks increasingly unlikely, at least
for the next decade. The world’s economic prospects will increasingly depend on
the fortunes of the East and South. The developing world already provides more than
50 percent of global economic growth and 40 percent of global investment. Its
contribution to global investment growth is more than 70 percent. China’s contribution
is now one and a half times the size of the US contribution.
In the World Bank’s baseline modeling of
future economic multipolarity, China—despite a likely slowing of its economic
growth—will contribute about one-third of global growth by 2025, far more than
any other economy. Emerging market demand for infrastructure, housing, consumer
goods, and new plants and equipment will raise global
investment to levels not seen in four decades. Global savings maynot match this rise, resulting in upward
pressure on long-term interest rates
Game-changer 2: The Governance Gap
During the next 15-20 years, as power becomes
even more diffuse than today, a growing number of diverse state and non-state
actors, as well as sub-national actors, such as cities, will play important
governance roles.
Currently about 50 countries are in the
awkward stage between autocracy and democracy, with the greatest number
concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast and Central Asia, and the Middle
East and North Africa. Both social science theory and recent history—the Color
Revolutions and the Arab Spring—support the idea that with maturing age
structures and rising incomes, political liberalization and democracy will
advance. However, many countries will still be zig-zagging their way through
the complicated democratization process during the next 15-20 years. Countries
moving from autocracy to democracy have a proven track record of instability.
Other countries will continue to suffer from
a democratic deficit: in these cases a country’s developmental level is more
advanced than its level of governance. Gulf countries and China account fora large number in this category.
The widespread use of new communications technologies will become
a double-edged sword for governance. On the one hand, social networking will enable
citizens to coalesce and challenge governments, as we have already seen in
Middle East. On the other hand, such technologies will provide governments—both
authoritarian and democratic—an unprecedented ability to monitor their
citizens. It is unclear how the balance will be struck between greater
IT-enabled individuals and networks and traditional political structures. In
our interactions, technologists and political scientists have offered divergent
views. Both sides agree, however, that the characteristics of IT use—multiple
and simultaneous action, near instantaneous responses, mass organization across
geographic boundaries, and technological dependence—increase the potential for
more frequent discontinuous change in the international system.
The current, largely Western dominance of
global structures such as the UN Security Council, World Bank, and IMF probably will have been
transformed by 2030 to be more in line with the changing hierarchy of new
economic players. Many second-tier emerging powers will be making their mark—at
least as emerging regional leaders. Just as the larger G-20—rather than G-8—was
energized to deal with the 2008 financial crisis
Game-changer 3: Potential for Increased Conflict
Historical trends during the past two decades
show fewer major armed conflicts and, where conflicts remain, fewer civilian and military
casualties than in previous decades. Maturing age structures in many developing countries point to continuing
declines in intrastate conflict. We believe the disincentives will remain strong against great power
conflict: too much would be at stake. Nevertheless, we need to be cautious
about the prospects for further declines in the number and intensity of
intrastate conflicts, and interstate conflict remains a possibility.
Intrastate conflicts have gradually increased
in countries with a mature overall population that contain a politically dissonant, youthful ethnic
minority. Strife involving ethnic Kurds in Turkey, Shia in Lebanon, and Pattani
Muslims in southern Thailand are examples of such situations. Looking forward,
the potential for conflict to occur in Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to remain
high.
Insufficient natural resources—such as water
and arable land—in many of the same countries that will have disproportionate
levels of young men increase the risks of intrastate conflict breaking out,
particularly in Sub-Saharan African and South and East Asian countries,
including China and India.
With the potential for increased
proliferation and growing concerns about nuclear security, risks are growing
that future wars in South Asia and the Middle East would risk inclusion of a
nuclear deterrent.
The current Islamist phase of terrorism might
end by 2030, but terrorism is unlikely to die completely. Many states might continue to use terrorist
group out of a strong sense of insecurity, although the costs to a regime of
directly supporting terrorists looks set to become even greater as
international cooperation increases. With more widespread access to lethal and disruptive
technologies, individuals who are experts in such niche areas as cyber systems
might sell their services to the highest bidder, including terrorists who would
focus less on causing mass casualties and more on creating widespread economic
and financial disruptions
Game-changer 4: Wider Scope of RegIonal Instability
Regional dynamics in several different
theaters during the next couple decades will have the potential to spill over and create global insecurity. The Middle
East and South Asia are the two regions most likely to trigger broader instability.
Progress toward greater regional cohesion and
integration in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa would promise increased stability in those regions
and a reduced threat to global security. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean will remain vulnerable, nevertheless, to
state failure through 2030, providing safe havens for both global criminal and
terrorist networks and local insurgents.
Game-changer 5: The Impact of New Technologies
Four technology arenas will shape global
economic, social, and military developments as well as the world community’s
actions pertaining to the environment by 2030.
Information
technology (IT) is entering
the 'big data' era. Process power and data storage are becoming almost free; networks and the cloud will
provide global access and pervasive services; social media and cybersecurity will be large new markets. This
growth and diffusion will present significant challenges for governments and societies, which must find ways
to capture the benefits of new IT technologies while dealing with the new threats that those
technologies present. Fear of the growth of an Orwellian surveillance state may lead citizens
particularly in the developed world to pressure their governments torestrict or dismantle certain big data
systems.
[See OHN
articles about 'Big Data' versus 'Open Data'.]
New manufacturing
and automation technologies such as additive manufacturing (3D printing)
and robotics have the potential to change work
patterns in both the developing and developed worlds. In developed countries these technologies will
improve productivity, address labor constraints, and diminish the need for
outsourcing.
Breakthroughs, especially for technologies pertaining to the security of
vital resources—will be neccessary to meet the food, water, and
energy needs of the world’s population. Key technologies likely to be at the forefront of maintaining such
resources in the next 15-20 years will include genetically modified crops, precision agriculture, water
irrigation techniques, solar energy, advanced bio-based fuels, and enhanced oil
and natural gas extraction via fracturing. Given the vulnerabilities of
developing economies to key resource supplies and prices and the early impacts
of climate change, key developing countries may realize substantial rewards in
commercializing many next-generation resource technologies first.
New health
technologies will continue to extend the average age of populations around
the world, by ameliorating debilitating physical and mental conditions and
improving overall well-being. The greatest gains in healthy longevity are
likely to occur in those countries with developing economies as the size of
their middle class populations swells. The health-care systems in these
countries may be poor today, but by 2030 they will make substantial progress in
the longevity potential of their populations; by 2030 many leading centers of
innovation in disease management will be in the developing world.
Game-changer 6: The role of the U.S.
How the United States (U.S.) international
role evolves during the next 15-20 years—a big uncertainty—and whether the US
will be able to work with new partners to reinvent the international system
will be among the most important variables in the future shape of the global
order. Although the U.S. (and the West’s) relative decline vis-a-vis the rising
states is inevitable, its future role in the international systemis much harder to project: the degree to
which the U.S. continues to dominate the international system could vary widely.
The U.S. most likely will remain “first among
equals” among the other great powers in 2030 because of its preeminence across a range of power
dimensions and legacies of its leadership role. More important than just its economic weight, the U.S. dominant
role in international politics has derived from its preponderance across the
board in both hard and soft power. Nevertheless, with the rapid rise of other countries, the “unipolar moment” is
over and Pax Americana—the era of
American ascendancy in international politics that began in
1945—is fast winding down.
The fall of the dollar as the global reserve
currency and substitution by another or a basket of currencies would be one of
the sharpest indications of a loss of U.S. global economic position, strongly
undermining Washington’s political influence too.
Conclusions
Finally, the report concludes by stating that
we have more than enough information to suggest that however rapid change has
been over the past couple decades, the rate of change will accelerate in the
future. One final warning – beware of Black Swan events, which could
derail many of the predictions.
Black Swan Evemts – The following
are selected examples of discrete events that could cause
large-scale disruption and alter the predictions made in this report.
- Severe Pandemic - No one can predict which pathogen will be the next to start spreading
to humans, or when or where such a development will occur. Such an outbreak
could result in millions of people suffering and dying in every corner of the
world in less than six months.
- Rapid Climate Change - Dramatic and unforeseen changes already are occurring at a faster rate
than expected. Most scientists are not confident of being able to predict
such events. Rapid changes in precipitation patterns—such as monsoons in India
and the rest of Asia—could sharply disrupt that region’s ability to feed its
population.
- Solar Geomagnetic Storms - Solar geomagnetic storms could knock out satellites, the electric
grid, and many sensitive electronic devices. Crippling solar geomagnetic storms
could pose a substantial threat because of the world’s dependence on
electricity
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